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O'F.: Administration of Estates--Advancement--Method of Hotchpot
RECENT CASE COMENTS
AD

isTRATION OF ESTATES -

ADVANCEMENT -

METHOD OF

HOTCHPOT. - A father died leaving considerable real and personal
property. Between the date of his death and the circuit pourt
decree dividing the property among his children, an appreciation
in property values ensued. Meantime nine out of ten of the children agreed to submit to a disinterested person the issue as to the
extent of the respective advancements theretofore made. Later
the tenth child refused to be bound by this arrangement. Upon
reference of the cause to a commissioner in chancery, he questioned
whether the findings made by the disinterested person were sound,
because in many instances checks were not included which might
well have been chargeable as advancements, but added, "However,
your commissioner feels that he would not be justified in disturbing a settlement among the heirs as to advancements which has
been agreed to by all." Held, that, first, the value of all property
of the parent to be distributed should be ascertained as of the
date of his death; second, unless the commissioner is clearly wrong
the court will not disturb his findings as to the valuation of the
estate; third, the court assumes the family "settlement" has no
binding effect; and finally, the payments made prior to the death
of the deceased, in whatever form they may have been made, are
advancements. Gaylord v. Hope Natural Gas Company.'
Heretofore on the first point decided, the local rule has been
ambiguous as to whether the valuation 6f all the estate, real and
personal, to be distributed after his death should be determined as
of the date of deceased's death or the date of distribution or partition.2

18 S. E. (2d) 189 (W. Va. 1940).
2 Little authority, if any, on this subject has been found.

In Roberts v. Coleman, 37 W. Va. 143, 16 S. E. 482 (1892), the commissioner ascertained both
the value of the estate and the amount of the advancements as of the date of
the deceased's death. No issue as to the date of the fixing of the values was
apparently raised. Quizere, as to whether the case is authority for ascertaining
the value of the deceased's estate as of the date of his death rather than at
some later time, such as the time of partition or distribution. In Kyle v.
Konrad, 25 W. Va. 760 (1885), the valuation of the parent's estate was turned
over to the commissioner to determine, but the court failed in its opinion to set
any definite date for such determination to be made. The court did, however,
decree that the children were to be charged with the value of the advancements
as of the time when the deeds were made, with interest from the date of the
death of the father. This case followed the rule laid down in the Virginia
cases that advancements were to be accounted for as of the value when received.
Beckwith v. Buller, 1 Wash. 224 (Va. 1793); Puryear v. Cabell, 24 Gratt. 260
(Va. 1874). No doubt the result reached in the principal case is reasonably
sound, as an easily workable rule.
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Secondly, the court has adopted the commissioner's valuation
of the deceased's estate, holding that unless the evidence is "clearly insufficient in any reasonable view of it to support the findings
of the commissioner", these latter must stand. In any event if the
valuation of the deceased's estate were to be made as of the date
of his death (1934) consideration should have been given its fair
market value, bearing in mind the unusual economic conditions of
that time. Am extremely low valuation was in fact made. The
decision might well have been otherwise, had further consideration
been given to the actual basis of assessment of land for purposes
of taxation,4 to the average opinion of responsible experts who
testified,5 and, above all, to the unusual amount of revenue which
the property yielded within the four-year period after his death.0
As to the third point, the upper court was far from being
definite.' Perhaps it was felt that the same result would have
been achieved without reference to the alleged arrangement among
the heirs, yet the instant decision might have squarely held such
3 Accord,

McClanahan v. McClanahan, 36 W. Va. 34, 14 S.E. 419 (1892).
4As to comparison of the tax assessment with the report of the appraisers,
"property which was assessed for the purpose of taxation at $159,295 is appraised at $185,720" (at p. 195). For the extent to which ordinary tax
assessment is representative of actual value, see BLAE, REPORT ON, TAXATION
n WEST VIRanVTr (1930) c. 5, and IATIoNAL INDUSTraLL CONFERENCE BOARD,
Tm.TAx PRoBLEmix WEST VIGiNiA (1925). Also see Central Realty Co.
v. Board of Review, 110 W. Va. 439, 440, 158 S. E. 537 (1931).
5As to the divergent opinions expressed by the various experts who tostified,
the court, commenting regarding a suggestion to strike an average for nscertaining the fair value of the timber item, remarked, "We do not think such
a method would reach a correct result in this case."
(At p. 195.) One of the
appraisers admitted their entire appraisal was "conservative".
In any
event, there was a wide discrepancy of opinion among the witnesses as to every
phase of the valuation of the land, timber and minerals. Perhaps the best
evidence as to the conservatism in the valuation was the later action of the
commissioner in making a general increase of approximately $20,000, without
specifying the items that had been undervalued.
6As to the estate's revenue-producting possibilities, the record in the case
indicates a gross yield out of the minerals totalling more than $100,000, between October, 1934, and May, 1938. Such an income is in sharp contrast with
the opinion of the appraisers to the effect that the whole value of the deceased's
estate (land, timber and minerals) was but $226,000. (It might be noted that
these oil and gas interests were valued for taxation at four times their annual
revenue, while the appraisers reduced the figure to three times their income.)
7 The cohrt observed (at p. 193) : 91... there is some little confusion on this
point by reason of a statement contained therein that, in his opinion, certain
additional charges should have been made against various heirs, but were not
made because he felt he "would not be justified in disturbing a settlement
among the heirs as to advancements which had been agreed to by al.' " The
court added later in the same opinion (at p. 194): ". .. we think that the
checks and papers introduced, and testimony taken before the commissioner,
aside from any question of the admissions or agreement of February 24, 1935,
as to these charges, will justify the commissioner's report."
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a "settlement" could have no weight in determining any question
as to advancements in future cases involviag analogous facts. The
authorities appear to be clear that such arrangement could not be
binding.8
Finally, the present case decides thaf whether or not a cheek
be denominated by the deceased as a "loan", the commissioner's
finding that it was in fact an advancement would not be disturbed 5 In other words, it seems that for the promotion of equality between the heirs, there was to be no differentiation as regards
sums given the heirs, in the absence of clear evidence that the
deceased conducted himself as a creditor, and that beyond question
he regarded the heir as a debtor because of the transaction between
them. By and large, that principle promotes a fair division of the
property, even though it seems to be squarely in conflict with the
usual thought that any evidence of the intent of the deceased opposed to an advancement is more or less conclusive.
The present decision is thus a most important one, to the
extent that it settles as to advancements these points in the administration of estates. Both in its holding that the value of the deceased's property should be ascertained as of the date of his death
and in its detailed exposition of the hotchpot method, the decision
should become a leading authority in local litigation.
P. J. 0'F.
CoNsmruoNAL LAW - DE GATION OF LEGISLATivE PowE
TO ADmnuSTRArvE BODIES op OFICERs. - D collided with P's air-

plane when landing in violation of certain air regulations fixed by
the West Virginia Bureau of Aeronautics under authority of a
statute giving such board authority over all phases of aerial activities, with power to make such rules and regulations as they
should see fit to adopt for the public safety. The board was required, however, "to adopt and enforce the provisions of the federal
8 Without all the parties, a compromise arrangement of this sort obviously
cannot stand. Campbell v. Lynch, 88 W. Va. 209, 106 S. E. 869 (1921); McAdams v. Bowen, 369 Ill. 325, 16 lN. Bl. (2d) 732 (1938). And, in order for
an investigation to conclude the parties, the disinterested party must properly
take into account all of the evidence, and arrive at his finding in judicial
fashion. Neill v. Flynn Lumber Go., 82 W. Va. 24, 95 S. E. 523 (1918) ; Rowe
v. Rowe, 144 Va. 816, 130 S. E. 771 (1925).
9 The court said (at p. 197): "'The view of this case we take is that whatever these payments may have been called, they were in truth advancements,
irrevocable in character; that no debt or obligation was created, and it necessarily follows that they are not subject to the statute of limitations."
IW. VA. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 29, art. 2A, § 2.
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